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Development through Schumpeterian Waves
… to Professor Schumpeter, business cycles are pulsations of the rate of economic evolution.
Simon Kuznets (1954) 
Background
In his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) presented the working of a capitalistic economy as an evolutionary process, where the business cycle results from the introduction and integration of innovations. The cycle is initiated, or triggered, by a major innovation. The initial innovation (or cluster of such innovations) is then followed by a massive diffusion of smaller innovations that exploit directly or indirectly the profit potential "announced" by the initial radical change. These further adjustments typically take place during the expansion of activity when uncertainty is reduced. When the novelty is exhausted the economic system tends toward a new equilibrium position with a higher level of welfare than the previous one. The industrial transformation that takes place during the cycle encourages firms to use new forms of production technologies, organizational structures, etc., and ill-adapted firms are eliminated.
Two important features of innovation-driven business cycles should be underlined here. The first is that economic fluctuations, or the business cycle, as presented above, was understood by Schumpeter to be an analytical unit of reference, a dynamic unit, (just as the equilibrium concept is a static reference point), rather than a mechanical outcome of a parameter set as in some macroeconomic models. It is the basic process by which the economy regenerates itself and reallocates resources in the integration of new information. The second feature, closely related to the first, is that the business cycle, expressing the transformation of production and markets, is in fact shaped by the interaction of two asymmetric and contradictory forces: creation or development on the one hand and adjustment or allocation on the other. Both "creative destruction", where new firms, families and forms of life arise through the introduction 3 of innovations while the older forms decline in the social-economic strata, and the more gradual adaptation of economic structure (in Schumpeter's terms, the "tendency towards equilibrium") should be regarded as an outcome of the basic interplay between development and allocation processes.
While the original novelty is attributed to the action of the entrepreneur who is obviously less risk adverse than other agents and is capable of anticipating the direction of change, other firms that follow require less entrepreneurial capability. The diffusion process that finally exhausts the profit opportunities created by the initial innovation largely relies on the adjustment behavior of rational price-taking agents. Thus the "representative agents" of these two facets of economic activities -the entrepreneur and the manager, or alternatively the innovator and the imitator, are characterized by different states of information and related uncertainty. They obey a different economic rationale and operate with different global outcomes (positive and zero-sum games, respectively) and the basic sense of norms and deviations (for example, the role of market failures) is also very different. Rosenberg (1976 Rosenberg ( , 1982 expressed the composition of the two types of innovation in several of his path-breaking works. Although he did not deny the contribution of major innovation to economic development and growth, he claimed that revolutionary innovation is in fact materialized through a sequence of gradual and cumulative development steps. He presented a famous example of the car industry to argue that, although the private automobile was certainly one of the great driving forces of the industrialization in the early 20 th century, it was not really (economically) present when few mechanical toys (the first automobiles) terrified horses in the countryside.
The revolution was only effective once Ford's chain production reduced costs and prices of car manufacture and made the automobile available to millions, gas stations sprung up along the highways and the whole suburban lifestyle developed. Nelson and Winter's "technological trajectories" (1977) contributed to a better understanding of the relation between successive innovations and the overall pattern of the constitution and development of a new technology, which is in fact a continuous 4 representation of a major innovation. Subsequent works by Sahal (1981) , Dosi (1982) , Freeman et al. (1982) , and Zuscovitch (1986) presented conceptual frameworks in which drastic innovations redefine the boundary of overall possibilities for economic agents through a paradigm shift. Agents then perform "normal" innovations which improve productivity and develop and exhaust the potential of the novelty until the next jump. Although these works undoubtedly offer an intellectually appealing framework for the endogenizing of major innovations in the form of a process of technological development, they remain within the sphere of what Nelson calls "appreciative theory".
New growth theories have focused for more than a decade on the relationship between technical change and growth. As is common in the neoclassical tradition, the representation of innovation is basically restricted to a process of continuous specialization via the division of labor in the Smithian tradition (Romer, 1986 (Romer, , 1990 ). Grossman and Helpman (1991) added some qualitative features to the analysis of innovation but essentially are guided by the framework of smooth growth without any jumps and discontinuities that are an essential feature of the growth process.
The new-Schumpeterian approach formalizing several Schumpeter's views of growth and innovation recognizes the contribution of both drastic and incremental innovations to economic growth and fluctuation. The work on creative destruction by Aghion and Howitt (1992) introduced a strong depreciation effect of drastic innovation on existing technology without, however, an analysis of the impact on subsequent
innovations. The models of general purpose technologies (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 8) and swarming mechanism (Justman, 1996 (Justman, , 1997 studied the growth and fluctuation caused by a sequence of incremental innovations resulting from an exogenously-determined drastic innovation. Jovanovic and Rob (1990) , and Cheng and Dinopoulos (1996) endogenized both breakthroughs and improvements. But in their models, the economy can have only one type of innovation at any instant in time and improvements have no any effects on breakthroughs.
Moreover, the Cheng-Dinopoulos model relies on a parameter indexing the exogenously accumulated basic research and scientific knowledge.
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In the present work we focus on the interaction and duality between drastic and incremental innovations. The model represents the two features of innovation-driven business cycles highlighted earlier. The first, due to its revolutionary nature, changes the course of dynamics by defining a new framework for the productive system and redefines the basis upon which economic agents compute their action plans. The second is of an incremental and cumulative nature and each step is governed by computable investment decisions according to the prevailing basic structure. The first type of behavior is indeed historically more associated with Schumpeter where innovation "pushes" economic activities. The behavior pattern of incremental innovation and gradual development is more associated with Smithian specialization through the division of labor, and also with Schmookler's (1966) "demand pull" hypothesis where the innovative activities are attracted and oriented by the relative prices and more general economic activities. However, neither the revolutionary nor the incremental behavioral pattern is a consistent way to view the dynamics of innovation.
In order to grasp the forces that govern the interaction we treat drastic innovations as the endogenous result of the investment of upstream firms. After a new drastic innovation succeeds, each downstream firm devotes their efforts in a series of incremental innovations which can further increase their production efficiency and make them more suitable to the new environment. Within this framework, a drastic innovation opens new opportunities for incremental innovations on the one hand and incremental innovations affect the profitability of next new drastic innovation and upstream firms' R&D decisions on the other hand. In a technical sense, our model synthesizes and generalizes the case of creative destruction imposing obsolescence on the productive structure à la Aghion and Howitt (1992) with subsequent adjustments as suggested by the general purpose technologies approach (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 8 ).
In the rest of the paper, section 2 presents a basic model exploring the duality between drastic and incremental innovations and illustrates how drastic innovations 
A Basic Model

Technologies and Innovations
In an industry, technology and physical capital are provided by an upstream incumbent.
A drastic new innovation invented by an upstream firm completely obsolesces the current production process and capital stock of n downstream firms that engage in monopolistic competition in the final goods market. Therefore, the drastic innovation introduces a creative destruction, which redefines the production possibilities frontier as argued by, amongst others, Dosi (1982) and Zuscovitch (1986 
is the contribution of the sth incremental innovation to cost reduction in the τth Schumpeterian wave. Since incremental R&D is performed over a one-period time lag, the R&D production is
where
. The formula implies that the productivity of the investment in incremental R&D might vary over different periods but it is identical across all downstream firms. A reasonable assumption about R&D production is that it has positive marginal returns but the gain is limited, i.e., This specification of technology illustrates that technological progress is in the form of a big leap forward, initiating a Schumpeterian wave, followed by a series of small steps of efficiency improvements. Another drastic innovation yields a new Schumpeterian wave. It captures part of Rosenberg's discussion (1976) of the relationship between the "announce effect" of the major innovation and the subsequent adjustments. Although the model shares some characteristics with the works by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and the models of general purpose technologies (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 8) , it goes beyond them. In the Aghion-Howitt model, downstream firms do not do any research and technological progress is generated solely by the breakthroughs of upstream firms. The general purpose technologies models presume drastic innovation are exogeneously given and incremental innovations have no impacts on them. In this sense, the present model 8 extends their discussions to a more general setting. Furthermore, if s iτ γ is achieved by learning-by-doing (LBD) instead of by incremental innovation, the model resembles the works of Young (1993) and Stern (1997) where the LBD process, after each innovation, can further improve production efficiency. LBD is discussed in the final section.
Drastic innovations have two implications in the model. The first is that it is not firm-specific; that is, if a new drastic innovation succeeds and is adopted by downstream firms, all these firms have the same technological improvement. The second is creative destruction, in the sense that if a new drastic innovation is materialized, not only does it make previous technology and physical capital obsolete, but it also renders previous incremental innovation meaningless. This latter characteristic is reflected in the non-accumulation of ) (t Katz and Shapiro (1987) argued that a minor innovation marginally reduces each firm's cost by the same amount and is irrelevant to their existing technology difference but a major innovation sweeps off existing difference and leads to the same post-innovation production cost. Moreover, incremental innovation could be made firm-specific in the model and therefore imitating other firms' outcomes of incremental R&D could cost time and money. In order to keep the model simple, however, we assume that each downstream firm can only keep their incremental innovation secret for one period and after that period rival firms can costlessly imitate the innovation without any further time delay. 
Decisions of Downstream Firms
Within each Schumpeterian wave, market equilibrium is determined by a Stackelberglike process, where all upstream firms are leaders announcing their investment in drastic innovation first while all downstream firms are followers who take the upstream firms' R&D expenditures as given in their decisions.
2 Downstream firms make two decisions:
price/output and investment in incremental innovations. The demand for each output is assumed to have a constant elasticity of substitution,
where I is a constant determined by aggregate demand and the number of downstream
is the price of firm i's product and the price index is defined as
Assuming the number of downstream firms is large enough so that price competition leads to a constant markup θ 1 and the equilibrium price is equal to
given the profile of marginal costs ) (t c i (i=1,2,…n). Since marginal costs decline stepwise as technology is improved, so do prices.
The investment in incremental innovation is determined by the gains it generates. Since an innovative firm can maintain its efficiency superiority for one period, downstream firm i needs only to consider the profit reward from incremental innovation in this period. It receives the profit flow (gross of R&D investment)
[ ] 
where r is the interest rate. By ignoring the effect of a firm's marginal cost on the price index, symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the first-order condition
with at least one equality. s=1, 2, …
The condition implies that the expected marginal return of incremental innovation must be equal to its expected cost in the case of positive investment. A standard assumption on the investment in incremental innovation is diminishing returns so that
monotonically increasing function and 0
. This assumption ensures an interior equilibrium if it exists.
As is obvious from the first-order condition, downstream firms' investment in incremental innovation declines if upstream firms invest more in drastic innovation. The reason is simple. When upstream firms spend more money on the new generation of technology, the hazard rate is larger, i.e., it will succeed sooner. Since it will obsolesce current technology and efficiency efforts completely, the expected return from incremental innovation based on the current generation of technology is lower. This discourages downstream firms' involvement in incremental innovation. If, for example, biotechnological breakthroughs appear at a faster rate (Grabowski, 1998) , this obviously 3 Hazard rate 1 + τ H is constant in these periods and positively relates to upstream firms' investment in the (τ+1)th drastic innovation. We will show how to obtain the probability in detail below.
reduces the investments of pharmaceutical firms in gradual improvements in chemicalbased medicines.
The model also shows that investment expenditures on incremental innovation for different periods are independent. This is a special property stemming jointly from the symmetry and the coincidence of the length of time-delay for an incremental R&D with the duration of its appropriation. This property ensures that expenditure on incremental innovation in each period is equal if the R&D production functions, ) (⋅ s g τ , are identical across periods. However, a more realistic assumption is that ) (⋅ s g τ declines as s increases which implies that efficiency improvement potential is gradually exhausted.
Decisions of Upstream Firms
The success of drastic innovation is assumed to be uncertain so that when a firm wins the race of drastic innovation competition, i.e., becomes the first inventor, it monopolizes the new technology until the technology is phased out by another newer drastic innovation. 5 The monopolist charges the same lump-sum license fee to all downstream firms for access to the new technology. Then the question is what license fee will each downstream firm be willing to pay for the τth radical innovation? It is clear that they are willing to pay up to the difference of two expected profit streams: the profit of adopting the τth drastic innovation from τ t onwards without any further incremental innovation, and the profit of using the existing technology at time τ t without further incremental innovation. This profit difference reflects the net gain of a downstream firm achieved by giving up the current production method and adopting a radically new one. In the profit difference, gains from incremental innovation should be excluded because they are the contribution of a downstream firm's own R&D efforts.
From (1) and (2), the marginal cost achieved by the τth drastic innovation is τ A .
But if a firm still uses the old generation of technology updated until time τ t , it has a 12 marginal cost
, where
is the largest integer of (
Therefore, if k downstream firms adopt the τth generation of technology while the remaining firms continue to use the old technology, the profit flow from adopting the new technology is given by:
With k licenses allowing access to the τth generation of technology, an upstream monopolist can receive total license fees equal to the flow ) , ( t k kl τ . To maximize the total license fees, it chooses k by solving
which gives the optimum k=n. This means that the monopolist always grants all downstream firms a license. The total license fees it can reap is
Since drastic innovation is uncertain, the time of upstream firm j successfully realizing the τth drastic innovation, ) ,
, is a continuously-distributed random variable. Following Lee and Wilde (1980) and Reinganum (1983) , if firm j invests a capital flow τ j z in the R&D project, starting from time 1 − τ t , the probability that the firm will succeed in implementing the innovation at or before τ t is assumed to be
Drastic innovation also has positive but diminishing returns, i.e., 0
For such an exponential distribution, the probability that no upstream firm will succeed until τ t but firm j
6 This simple expression depends on monopolistic competition so that
. For an oligopoly, the profit difference is more complex due to an integer problem (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986 
It 
). In other words, they use 
with at least one equality, τ=1, 2, …
is the profit stream of downstream firms, obtainable by adopting a new drastic technology. , downstream firms know the probability distribution of the τth drastic innovation succeeding since τ z is known. They therefore choose their incremental R&D investment in the (τ-1)th Schumpeterian wave according to (9). 9 Equilibrium price and output in the goods market are determined by (1), (4) and (6).
Equilibrium
Economic dynamics is thus characterized by a sequence of waves initiated by technology jumps of drastic innovations with substantial reallocation of resources and reorganization of markets. These waves represent real stages in economic development as Schumpeter (1939) and Kuznets (1954) emphasized. Within each wave a series of progressive efficiency improvements mildly change resource allocation at each adjusting step, marginally push the production frontier outward and moderately adjust production and markets in a cumulative manner. In this sense, the model consolidates Schumpeter's analytical construction of innovation-triggered business cycles.
Proposition 1. Given
1 + τ H , there exist equilibrium investment decisions { } s y τ (s=1,
2,…) and τ z that satisfy (9) and (16).
For the proof, see the appendix.
An obvious characteristic of the model is that decisions of up-and downstream firms in each wave are interactive in conjunction with the expectation of the next drastic 8 τ z is decided at the beginning of the (τ-1)th Schumpeterian wave and maintained during that wave.
innovation. If upstream firms expect that the (τ+1)th drastic innovation will succeed sooner due to higher investment, i.e., 1 + τ H is larger, they will reduce their R&D expenditures on the current drastic innovation (the τth innovation). The reason is that if the (τ+1)th drastic innovation comes sooner, downstream firms will be willing to pay a smaller license fee for the τth drastic innovation since it may last a shorter period (see Figure 1 for the time structure). This is clear from (17) smaller τ V will naturally prevent upstream firms from investing further in the τth drastic innovation. From this analysis, we can draw the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If all firms expect an increase in the probability of success of the (τ+1)th drastic innovation, upstream firms will reduce their R&D investment in the τth drastic innovation but downstream firms will increase their incremental innovation activities to improve the efficiency in the (τ-1)th Schumpeterian wave. Moreover, an increase in incremental innovation expenditure by downstream firms in the (τ-1)th wave will reduce upstream firms' incentive for the τth drastic innovation further.
10 Holding τ V constant, the equality of (16) 
Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, we focus on stationary equilibrium, where the investment series } { s y τ and } { τ z are wave-invariant such that 
and that the R&D productivity of incremental innovation based upon each drastic innovation is identical, i.e., ) ( ) ( ) (
. To simplify the notation, it is further assumed that there exists an integer S such that ) (
when S s > ; that is, in the first S periods, downstream firms have the same production function for incremental R&D but after that they cannot improve efficiency at all. In reality, we might observe that right after a drastically new technology has been introduced efficiency improvements are relatively easy to make.
Then the efficiency potential of the new generation technology is gradually exhausted and efficiency improvement is more and more difficult until it becomes economically infeasible. 13 Our simplification is an approximation of this process with a switch off in period S.
Noting the assumptions on the production function of incremental innovation, ) (⋅ g , 14 the stationary equilibrium y>0 for any given ) (z mh H = is uniquely characterized by
for each period S s ≤ . In these periods, each downstream firm has an efficiency
is a decreasing function, y declines as H increases. But when S s > , y=0 so that goods production has no efficiency update.
Turning to drastic innovation, the first-order condition (16) can be rewritten as
indexes the largest integer of 1/λH, which is the expected time for a drastic innovation to succeed or the expected life of a generation of technology.
Variable z affects V(z) in two ways. First, an increase in z reduces the expected life 1/λH
, the increase results in a larger V if γ remains constant. The intuition is that for a shorter expected life of drastic innovations, downstream firms have less frequent opportunities to improve efficiency. Consequently, at the time that a drastically new technology is introduced, the gap between old and new technology is larger. Second, because ) (y g = γ and y is a decreasing function of z 13 In his recent contribution, Weitzman (1997) provides an interesting explanation for this process of potential exhaustion by pointing out that the new principle innovation is crossed with existing technical objects.
14 They are:
determined by (9a), an increase in z discourages the downstream firms' efforts at incremental innovation, and in turn increases γ and V.
Denoting the left-hand side of (16a) Proof: Noting that W(z) is a monotonic increasing function, the proof is similar to proposition 1 and we omit it here.
The dynamic time path of production costs, prices and outputs of downstream firms consists of a series of big random jumps and a number of small non-random steps between any two adjacent jumps. More specifically, assume that the industry is established by the first drastic innovation and define (2) and (4) 
where y is the solution of (9a) and (16a = at the beginning of the second wave. After that, their cost, price and output evolve in stepwise-increase or -decrease as in the first wave.
The economy grows through a cyclical process infinitely.
An interesting outcome of the model is that although agents in stationary equilibrium take the same decisions, all upstream firms spend a constant amount z on drastic innovations and all downstream firms invest y in incremental R&D, the economy still fluctuates. The Schumpeterian business cycle is rooted in the economy and without fluctuations it cannot grow. This growth pattern obviously differs from the marginal evolution of growth models by Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Young (1993) . In its spirit our Schumpeterian model is closer to Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Justman (1997), and Stein (1997) in emphasizing the discontinuity of economic growth. However, it goes further by integrating into the business cycle through the interaction of the up-steam and downstream agents, part of the dynamics of development and allocation processes.
We turn now to study the effects of parameters of the model on stationary equilibrium. To simplify the discussion, we presume the equilibrium of (9a) and (16a) is unique or that the equilibrium does not jump from one dynamic locus to another when a parameter of the model has a marginal variation. Since y is inversely related to z, the following analysis focuses on z.
Consider λ first. A larger λ means that a drastic innovation is less expensive in the sense that it has a greater probability to be invented given the same amount of investment. It is easy to see that 0 ) ( effects. First, it shifts the marginal revenue curve of drastic innovation upward and the marginal cost curve downward given that the license fee is invariant, 15 resulting in higher investment by upstream firms. Second, a large λ implies that the next drastic innovation will arrive sooner and that downstream firms have less incentive to improve efficiency so that V is larger, which also stimulates upstream firms' investment. Third, when the next drastic innovation arrives sooner, the expected life of a drastic innovation is shorter, a winning upstream firm can therefore reap a smaller license fee L from the same V, which discourages investment in drastic innovation. The third effect is offset by the second leading the net effect to be second-order small in comparison with the first effect. Thus, a larger λ unambiguously yields more investment in drastic innovation.
From (18), a smaller a represents more significant of a drastic innovation.
Accordingly, it is more attractive to upstream firms. But it has no direct impact on the behavior of downstream firms although it indirectly reduces their interests in incremental innovations through upstream firms' expenditure increase on drastic innovations. This can be shown by the upward shift of V(t) and the unchanged W(t) as a declines in Figure 2 .
In a one-shot game of an uncertain R&D race to win a fixed technology reward, Lee and Wilde (1980) and Yin and Zuscovitch (1995) claim that the number of firms in the industry can stimulate each competitor's R&D investment. These models are quite similar to our model if it is simplified to have only upstream firms and these firms only meet once in the game. But these two conditions prevent us from reaching unambiguous conclusions on the R&D stimulation of upstream firms. The reason is that an increase in m shifts both the marginal revenue and the marginal cost curves of drastic innovations upward when the license fee, L, is fixed. 16 Moreover, a larger m implies a shorter and L. On the other hand, the monopoly power of an upstream incumbent can be maintained for a shorter period of time and it therefore receives a lower L. In Figure 2 , the ambiguity is depicted by the upward shifts of both V(z) and W(z) curves.
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In the model the effects of n, the number of downstream firms, is also unambiguous, depending on the sales of each downstream firm. Clearly, W(z) is independent of n. From (4) we can see that I is equal to the sales of each downstream firm. If consumer expenditure on the output of this industry is constant, which would be the case if, for instance, the utility function for composite goods of this industry and the remaining economy is Cobb-Douglas, then I is proportional to the inverse of n.
Generally, I can decline more or less than proportionately with the inverse of n as n increases. Thus V(z) may shift upward, remain unchanged or shift downward as more firms enter the downstream sector, depending on whether nI rises, remains constant or falls. Consequently, the expenditures on drastic innovation is higher, unchanged, or lower, respectively.
is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods, a larger θ corresponds to a situation where the goods in the economy are more homogeneous. Although θ has no direct effect on W(z), its effect on V(z) is ambiguous.
The reason is that a larger θ implies a more competitive market. It reduces the profit stream from using old as well as new generation technology.
The parameter S in the model is determined by the property of drastic and incremental innovations. On the one hand, a larger S may be the result of a more revolutionary drastic innovation since it promises a greater potential for subsequent incremental innovation. On the other hand, a large S can also result from the relative insignificance of each round of incremental innovation. Consider now an increase in S from an initial level S* to S*+1. This increase breaks the first segment of the initial V(z) curve into two segments and leaves others unchanged. Moreover, the first segment of (9a) illustrates that the greater is r, the smaller is y, and consequently the larger is γ.
Thus an increase in r also shifts V(t) upward. This leads to ambiguous effects of r on the equilibrium.
The findings of this comparative dynamics can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. Stationary investment in drastic innovation z increases but investment in incremental innovation y decreases if λ or nI increases or a decreases. An increase in S reduces z and raises y if
and yields no effect otherwise. But the effects of m, θ and r on y and z are ambiguous.
Extensions of the Basic Model
Physical Capital Costs
Although the innovation may come in the form of intangible assets and blueprints, its 
WF
, the effect is ambiguous and depends on the shape and relative shift of the WF(z) and V(z) curves.
Learning-By-Doing
To focus on LBD, assume downstream firms do not engage in any incremental innovation activities. (1993) , the model differs from Young's in that the learning effects are the result of a drastic process innovation instead of marginal progress in new product invention. It is 20 The specification implies that the longer the technology is applied the greater are cumulative learning effects. An alternative is to assume that learning effects depend on the cumulative output and downstream firms' production decisions will take these effects into account. plausible to assume learning effects only improve production efficiency marginally so that τ Γ is assumed to be much greater than For stationary equilibrium, the first-order condition is (16c) but V(z) in ( Figure 1 
